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DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

December 2h, 1958

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


Subject: NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany

General Norstad is anxious to proceed with the provision of an atomic capability for German NATO forces under his command. The German forces have atomic-capable fighter-bomber aircraft and are scheduled to acquire other atomic-capable weapons (such as NIKEs and Natadors). It remains to ensure that atomic bombs and warheads can be made available to German forces in case of need under the same arrangements as are being worked out, or are in prospect, for the forces of other NATO countries.

...... In all cases, the actual atomic weapons would remain in U.S. custody and control.

Defense Minister Strauss approached General Norstad during the recent NATO Ministerial meeting and indicated that the German Government wishes the NATO stockpile program extended to cover German forces, starting with a German fighter-bomber unit. This matter was discussed with the Secretary on the return trip from Paris, who stated he saw no objection on political grounds to SACHUR's proceeding with this matter in accordance with the latter's own military judgment, subject to prior notification to Chancellor Adenauer by Ambassador Bruce.

We have carefully weighed this matter and consider it desirable for Ambassador Bruce to discuss the matter with the Chancellor as soon as possible. The development of an atomic capability by German forces, as well as by other NATO forces, is





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is essential if NATO defenses are to keep pace with the offensive capabilities of the Soviets, and will be an indication of the West's firmness and resolve, particularly with respect to the Berlin situation. We recognize that when this matter becomes public, the Soviets will intensify their propaganda against the "atomic rearmament" of Germany. There may also be criticism from certain political circles in Germany who are in opposition to Chancellor Adenauer. We think, however, that the gain to Germany and to NATO will outweigh any disadvantages from such propaganda or criticism.

Enclosed herewith for your approval is a proposed State-Defense message to Ambassador Bruce which will authorize him to proceed with discussions with the Chancellor. The Department of Defense has concurred in this message.

> Robert Murphy Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested message.







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Authority 00 R 87-307 46

By Ac NIE Date (2/12/2

SENT TO: Amembassy BONN

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#### EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS AND THURSTON

## LIMITED DISTRIBUTION STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

- A. Bonn tel to Dept 1336, rptd info Paris 412, London 290.
- B. Deptel to Paris 2257, rptd info Paris 1314, London 5839.
- C. Paris tel to Dept 2305, rptd info Bonn 214, London 498.
- D. Dept's G-326 to Bonn, rptd info Paris G-514.

We assume from reftel A that, having weighed possible political hazards suggested by last para of ref D, you see no RPT no reason for not RPT not approaching Chancellor after receiving definite confirmation from SACEUR to you that SACEUR is prepared to have this matter go forward. On this assumption, and as soon as you receive confirming message from SACEUR, you may make arrangements to see Adenauer Jan 2 or 3. Dept leaves to your discretion whether or not you wish to suggest that Strauss should be present.

We of course agree fully with line SACEUR took with Strauss (paragraph two reftel C) regarding need for maintaining flexibility, no RPT no commitment of weapons, etc.

After Chancellor has indicated his agreement in principle to extension of NATO stockpile system in Germany to include German forces, consideration can be given to timing and form of notification to North Atlantic Council.

